Some music with Systemabsturz, some privacy advocacy with CCC, some IT security for activists and some smartphone forensics.

Future updates on IT security for activism things will be posted here:


Finding (state) malware: methods and tools for civil forensic analysis
Viktor, Janik Besendorf, Niclas Schwarzlose

Not only since the Pegasus Project, which exposed the surveillance of numerous activists, journalists and opposition figures by the NSO Group's Pegasus state malware, state malware have posed a threat to the privacy of those affected and their contacts. In order to make such attacks visible and provable, analyses are needed using methods and tools similar to those used by security agencies, but which should be open source and adhere to ethical standards of consensual forensics. In our workshop we want to give an overview of what approaches, methods, and tools are suitable for these analyses to best perform forensic data extraction in a civilian context and present what tools and scripts we have developed ourselves. We all work in civil forensics ourselves and want to share our experiences on what has worked for us and what has not.
The presented tools are of course not only suitable for the search of state malware, but also for any other malware such as stalkerware or ransomware.

Theater Hall - E.T.I. (HiP main stage)
HIP - Track 1 - Room 5
IT Security for Activists

The world is getting more digital and activism is as well.
But the world of It security can seem overwhelming and its easy to feel lost and helpless. In this talk I want to present the IT security guidelines that I am developing right now. They are meant to help for activists to find fitting security measures for a given activism project, without being 300 pages long or overly complex. Ideally they empower non technical individuals to protect their data better and make informed decisicions about their personal it security.

Track 2 Room 2
HIP - Track 2 - Room 2
"That wasn't me, my phone was hacked!" - Should evidence from phones be permitted in court?

Trading of zero day vulnerabilities is still possible and common.
But what does that mean for their judicial admissibility? Can the analysis results of the phone's data be used in court if vulnerabilities for the device are available at Zero day vendors?

mainhall stage - c-base
c-base mainhall