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UID:pretalx-camp2023-AS9MQY@pretalx.c3voc.de
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20230819T140000
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DESCRIPTION:Microcontrollers are used in numerous applications and even in 
 security-relevant areas\, for example in form of hardware security tokens 
 or crypto wallets.\nHence\, the non-volatile flash memory of microcontroll
 ers contains sensitive assets such as cryptographic secrets or intellectua
 l property\, that need to be protected from being read out by adversaries.
 \nIn order to prevent illegal extraction through the integrated debug inte
 rface\, dedicated protection features are in place.\n\nIn this talk\, we t
 ake a look at an attack vector that we call *flash erase suppression*. Thi
 s attack vector leverages that many microcontrollers allow to deactivate t
 heir debug interface protection under the condition that the entire flash 
 memory is erased first.\nThe attack suppresses this mass erase with a glit
 ch whereby its contents are preserved and accessible through the activated
  debug interface.\nThis type of attack was first presented by Schink et al
 . at CHES 2021\, but only received little attention so far.\n\nThe talk pr
 ovides an introduction to this attack vector and gives a foretaste of a co
 mprehensive analysis that will be published soon.\nThe attack will be demo
 nstrated live on stage with an exemplary microcontroller.
DTSTAMP:20260411T200829Z
LOCATION:Milliways
SUMMARY:Unlock the Door to my Secrets\, but don’t Forget to Glitch - marc
URL:https://pretalx.c3voc.de/camp2023/talk/AS9MQY/
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